心灵、语言和社会

约翰·塞尔

出版时间

2001-02-01

ISBN

9787532724949

评分

★★★★★
书籍介绍
塞尔在这本书里做的,不是给哲学问题编手册,而是用一套方法把心灵、语言、社会实在串成一张相互依存的网。最见功力的地方,是他把'意识在进化上的作用'当成试金石:假设人能去掉意识仍照常生存,结论竟是预设了二元论——这恰恰是他要推翻的。于是意识不再是玄奥的谜题,而成了物理世界里一个普通的生物学部件。读者普遍反馈它'清晰好读',正因他把神经科学、认知科学、甚至哥德尔定理都拉进来为论证供血,却始终坚持'世界独立于我们的意识而存在'这一朴素立场。它适合那些不愿被分析哲学的命题游戏困住、想要重新叩问'心身如何可能'的读者。
AI导读
核心看点
  • 概括塞尔四十余年研究,分析心灵、语言与社会实在的逻辑依存关系。
  • 突破分析哲学框架,融合神经科学、认知科学等多学科成果探讨心身问题。
  • 主张外在实在论,认为宇宙独立于心灵存在,真理即与事实相符。
读者共识
  • 行文逻辑严密,论述清晰坦诚,是塞尔哲学思想简明扼要的入门读物。
  • 成功将语言哲学回归传统基本问题,对意识生物性及社会实在有深刻洞察。
  • 虽部分观点显保守或存争议,但整体极具启发性,值得反复研读与反思。
精彩摘录
  • "我们在探讨某种具有共同表型的有机物的(phenotypical)特征的进化作用的问题时,通常采用的方法就是想象这种特征不存在,同时保持其余的自然常项,然后,再来看发生什么情况。当你想象植物不能进行光合作用,或者鸟不能飞翔,同时保持其余的自然常项,你就会知道这些特征在进化上的作用是怎样的了。那么我们试着把这种方法用于意识看看。想象我们大家都陷于昏迷状态,而且都倒卧在地,无依无助。你会看到,我们会很快死灭。但是,怀疑论者对这个问题并不这样想象。他们想象我们的行为仍旧一样,只是没有意识罢了。但这恰恰是没有保持其余的自然常项,因为在实际生活中能使我们得以生存下去的许许多多行为都是有意识的行为。在实际生"
  • "I accept the Enlightenment vision. I think that the universe exists quite independently of our minds and that, within the limits set by our evolutionary endowments, we can come to comprehend its nature. I believe that the real change since the nineteenth century is not that the world has become unin"
  • "Gödel’s proof is a kind of support to the traditional rationalist conception that separates ontology (what exists) from epistemology (how we know). Truth is a matter of correspondence to the facts. If a statement is true, there must be some fact in virtue of which it is true. The facts are a matter "
  • "The set of statements I give you about reality and truth can be traced as a theory or even a set of theories, but when the Background is functioning — when it is, so to speak, doing its job — we do not need a theory. Such presuppositions are prior to theories."
  • "The first, that there is a real world existing independently of us, I like to call “external realism.” … It asserts that the existence of the real world, and distinguishes from other sorts of realism. … The second view, that a statement is true if things in the world are the way the statement says t"
  • "What we think of as material objects are really just collections of “ideas,” … [that is,] states of consciousness. ... It asserts that the only reality is that of “ideas” in this special sense of the world. ... Reality is ultimately not a matter of something existing independently of our perceptions"
  • "The appeal of idealism, in short, is that the gulf between reality and appearance, the gulf that makes skepticism possible, is removed. Realist consists in systematic appearances."
  • "It satisfies a basic urge to power. It just seems too disgusting, somehow, that we should have to be at the mercy of the "real world." It seems too awful that our representations should have to be answerable to anything but us."
下载
收藏