A Theory of Justice - John Rawls

A Theory of Justice

John Rawls

出版社

Belknap Press

出版时间

1999-09-30

ISBN

9780674000780

评分

★★★★★
书籍介绍

A Theory of Justice is a widely-read book of political and moral philosophy by John Rawls. It was originally published in 1971 and revised in both 1975 (for the translated editions) and 1999. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to solve the problem of distributive justice by utilising a variant of the familiar device of the social contract. The resultant theory is known as "Justice as Fairness", from which Rawls derives his two famous principles of justice: the liberty principle and the difference principle.

[edit] Objective

In A Theory of Justice Rawls argues for a principled reconciliation of liberty and equality. Central to this effort is an account of the circumstances of justice (inspired by David Hume), and a fair choice situation (closer in spirit to Kant) for parties facing such circumstances, and seeking principles of justice to guide their conduct. These parties face moderate scarcity, and they are neither naturally altruistic nor purely egoistic: they have ends they seek to advance, but desire to advance them through cooperation with others on mutually acceptable terms. Rawls offers a model of a fair choice situation (the original position with its veil of ignorance) within which parties would hypothetically choose mutually acceptable principles of justice. Under such constraints, Rawls believes that parties would find his favoured principles of justice to be especially attractive, winning out over varied alternatives, including utilitarian and libertarian accounts.

[edit] The "original position"

Main article: Original position

Like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, Rawls belongs to the social contract tradition. However, Rawls' social contract takes a slightly different form from that of previous thinkers. Specifically, Rawls develops what he claims are principles of justice through the use of an entirely and deliberately artificial device he calls the Original position, in which everyone decides principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance. This "veil" is one that essentially blinds people to all facts about themselves that might cloud what notion of justice is developed.

"no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance."

According to Rawls, ignorance of these details about oneself will lead to principles which are fair to all. If an individual does not know how he will end up in his own conceived society, he is likely not going to privilege any one class of people, but rather develop a scheme of justice that treats all fairly. In particular, Rawls claims that those in the Original Position would all adopt a maximin strategy which would maximise the position of the least well-off.

They are the principles that rational and free persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association [Rawls, p 11]

It is important to keep in mind that the agreement that stems from the original position is both hypothetical and nonhistorical. It is hypothetical in the sense that the principles to be derived are what the parties would, under certain legitimating conditions, agree to, not what they have agreed to. In other words, Rawls seeks to persuade us through argument that the principles of justice that he derives are in fact what we would agree upon if we were in the hypothetical situation of the original position and that those principles have moral weight as a result of that. It is nonhistorical in the sense that it is not supposed that the agreement has ever, or indeed could actually be entered into as a matter of fact.

Rawls claims that the parties in the original position would adopt two such principles, which would then govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages across society.

[edit] The First Principle of Justice

“ First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.[1] ”

The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest. It is a matter of some debate whether freedom of contract can be inferred as being included among these basic liberties.

The first principle is more or less absolute, and may not be violated, ev

目录
Preface for the Revised Edition
Preface
PART ONE THEORY
Chapter Justice as Fairness
The Role of Justice

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用户评论
还是读英文版更舒服,不过罗尔斯的结构安排实在没让人看懂,有关正义的环境,原初状态等重要理论假设前提完全应该放在前面。似乎是迫不及待而又得意洋洋地提前把正义两原则摆出来。另,罗尔斯对司法的忽视让人怀疑他不是生活在米国。
竟然还是大一还是大二的时候借的那本!里面有我当年的贴条~读了第一部分(theory)。以前不理解为什么说难读,现在理解了。最赞的是无知之幕啊,这个被用烂了的概念,还是觉得这个理念很天才。不过一心想看为什么在初始位置能得出那两条原则,可是到了关键处就打马虎眼,怪不得XL说漏洞百出呢。。。是我读得不够细么?不过结合Sandel的讲课,最震撼的是natural endowment,we don't actually deserve what we have。人要学会心存敬畏,这是多么重要。这也是a case against perfection给我的最大启示。
I read this and believed some truth in it. A good book about political philosophy that you must read.
相当牛逼。
看了假设的部分 不知道应该佩服Rawls还是Kant
(看了快四周了标一下)除了经典的视角之外,有一节研讨课上让讨论罗尔斯的basic liberties缺少了什么(因为罗尔斯说这个list是可以变更调整的的),一位拉丁裔同学说没有讲freedom of immigration,我说罗尔斯没有任何关于anti-discrimination、race和gender的讨论(我说的时候感觉这个视角可能会有点奇怪,不知道是不是相关,结果发现在下一节课的reading就是Shiffrin的paper哭死)越来越感觉这种和现实高度相关的哲学没有办法简单通过思想的推演实现,一定要有具身性的经验支撑,和你切身所在的处境相关。
《正义论》中最核心的主张直白点翻译就是”扶弱和济贫“——这必然导致”锄强和劫富“,但它就是正义吗? 有关正义最根本的问题不是找到界定对错(公平/不公平)的黄金原则,而是决定谁是法官或是规则制定者。 “什么是正义?”是一个永远没有标准答案的问题,重要的不是答案而是寻找答案的过程。 正如书名所指It's a theory(of many).
重读。还是着重看了前40节。非常惊讶于罗尔斯方法论的自觉和融贯,是绝大部分当代作品做不到的 (which makes political philosophy increasingly boring...). 另外强烈怀疑moral arbitrariness of natural assets这个观点的重要性——这个论证在罗尔斯的系统里完全可以扔掉,然而罗尔斯之后的平等主义者似乎都非常关心这件事,让人很诧异。
用中译本辅助阅读完了第一编理论部分。总体来说论证清晰有力,也算好理解。 罗尔斯的正义论的核心是justice as fairness,fairness体现在平等与平等之下的差别的有机结合。概括正义的两个原则:平等的自由之优先性+差别原则。差别是正义的,当它至少能促进the least advantaged的发展。可以看出罗尔斯的正义论坚持着个体的优先性,最明显的是反对功利主义与补偿原则。他想要的正义是促进每一个个体(而不是总和)的利益的增加,也是一种发展着的正义。原初状况作为推论前提简直是神来之笔,对两种可能的功利主义的考量增强了正义论的契约论立场的有效性。 最后想说的是,似乎很难论断罗尔斯的正义论归属于伦理学三大理论中的哪一个,博众所长的契约论实在太庞大了。
很上头
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