What We Owe to Each Other - T. M. Scanlon

What We Owe to Each Other

T. M. Scanlon

出版时间

2000-11-15

ISBN

9780674004238

评分

★★★★★
书籍介绍

Scanlon offers a sharp challenge to much contemporary moral philosophy. Most philosophers think that agreements between people play only a subsidiary role in moral theory. What is right or wrong is independent of what people accept. Agreements rest on morality; they do not underlie it. Scanlon dissents. In his conception, morality depends on principles it would not be reasonable for people to reject. These agreements do not derive from further moral facts. Scanlon also challenges the view that desires give reasons for action, leveling heavy artillery at the contrary position of Bernard Williams. The originality, scope, and careful argument of this work mark it as an indispensable book.

T. M. Scanlon is Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity at Harvard University.

目录
Introduction
Reasons and Values
Reasons
Values
Well-Being

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用户评论
由善地入坑,a nice try,但是这个理论又复杂又难懂写了这么老长一本书,应该能看出来不美,至少不是正确的形式的吧?
感觉所有的研究,都始于motivation outside consciousness.
斯坎伦的分析太赞了。提问的方式、如何分析一个概念、如何检讨一个主张(主张成立的合理性、预设的前提、前提是否混淆了一些概念),好好体会。另突然发现这本书的封面是莫兰迪,一位只画简单静物的画家,感觉发现了什么...
二刷依然觉得scanlon的写作是pain in the ass, 但确实也看到很多两年前看不到的东西。scanlon对reasons first最强的motivation其实是对实践理性(也适用于认知理性)的一个观察:实践理性不仅是横向的(weighing options),还有verticality。reasoning是关于determining the domain of deliberation(Kratzer的modal base vs. ordering source?)。要阐述这种现象,最自然的是通过reasons:higher order reasons excluding first order reasons.
考验耐心,有些地方相当琐碎,但是呈现出来的契约论观点还是挺吸引人的。
五星好评
又是一部大砖头
Ch 1 reason和Ch 2 value;Scanlon反对以纯目的论的方式处理value,即有内在价值的事态就是要得到促进的,并通过理由reason解构了道义论和后果论对于value的阐释,认为不是后果的合意性而是理由的恰当性得以界定value。进而,区分了valuing和valuable,前者是认为自己有理由对该事物持某种肯定态度并有理由以某些与之相关的方式行动,后者是主张其他人也有理由像你一样value它。在这个意义上,valuable并不是一种给我们提供理由的特性,而是该事物具有其他特性为按照某种方式对待它提供了理由。继续阅读Scheffler和Scanlon关于valuing和valuable之区别的分歧,见Reason and Recognition 2011
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