The Moral Problem - Michael Smith

The Moral Problem

Michael Smith

出版时间

1994-12-05

ISBN

9780631192466

评分

★★★★★
书籍介绍
This widely anticipated volume offers a systematic introduction to and striking analysis of the central issues animating current debate in moral philosophy.
精彩摘录
  • "we seem to think moral questions have correct answers; that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts; that moral facts are wholly determined by circumstances; and that, by engaging in moral conversation and argument, we can discover what these objective moral facts determined by"
  • "moral judgments seem to be, or imply, opinions about the reasons we have for behaving in certain ways, and, other things being equal, having such opinions is a matter of finding ourselves with a corresponding motivation to act."
  • "Can we reconcile the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgment with the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume?"
  • "……我的动机……是衍生性的,是因为它们来源于我当前对于做什么事是正确的判断以及我的基本动机(一种对于做什么是“正确的”之非衍生性关注)的总和。 然而,如果这就是强外在主义者所能给予的,关于在善良且意志坚定之人那里道德判断与道德动机之间可靠关联的最好解释,那么,在我看来,我们对此有一个直截了当的归谬法(reductio)。因为,该解释只有在主张那个善良的人实际上是被促动着去做正确的事(是一种命题模态而不是事物模态的理解)的时候,才是种可行解释,而那肯定是一个相当令人难以置信的主张。因为常识告诉我们,如果善良的人判断诚实是正确的,或判断关心他们的儿女、朋友和同事是正确的,或判断得到他们所应得的是正"
用户评论
经典,与Brink、Foot、休谟主义者(动力的理由内在主义者、欲望满足理论者)的对话系统、全面、清晰,让人印象深刻 对slote的消化尤其惊艳,判断的动力内在主义相对于外在主义,才是更加“当下即是”的理论(外在主义与“道德拜物教”)
太膜拜这样的写作了!简单来说,史密斯的解决方案是:x拥有规范性理由做p当且仅当x拥有完全的理性时意欲去做p,因此道德信念在多大程度上能导致道德行动,就取决于主体在多大程度上是理性的。看起来像是Humean和Kantian的融合,但总觉得根本上还是更接近康德。稍显薄弱的环节是对“完全理性”的解释。很有趣的是他借用了罗尔斯的“反思平衡”,最后得出的结论却是(至少应当相信)存在普遍的道德事实。
什么时候我的水平能有点提升能不再只会说“好好好好好好”🥲🤤
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