书籍介绍
这本书最见功力的地方,在于扎哈维坚持把「第一人称的主体性」当作思考自我与他人关系的起点,而非像社会建构论那样把自我还原为关系的产物。读者反复提及的「同感(empathy)」正是要回答:我们究竟如何能在体验层面直接触及他人,而非通过推理或投射去「猜」另一个心灵。全书由此分为体验的自我、同感理解、人际的自我三条线索,并以「羞耻」这一看似日常的章节收束,指向自我如何在他人目光中成形。多位读者指出其论证清晰好读,但也有人批评其理论模型偏简单、与作者另一部著作高度重复。它适合对现象学、心灵哲学及自我认同问题有基础、愿意跟随第一人称视角一路追问的读者;若期待一本观点锋利、层层推进的专著,或许会感到部分章节浅尝辄止。
作者简介
Dan Zahavi is Professor of Philosophy and Director of Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. He was elected member of Institut International de Philosophie in 2001 and of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in 2007. From 2001 to 2007 he served as president of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology, and he is currently co-editor in chief of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. In his systematic work, Zahavi has mainly been investigating the nature of selfhood, self-consciousness, and intersubjectivity. His most important publications include Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität (Kluwer, 1996), Self-awareness and Alterity (Northwestern University Press, 1999), Husserl's Phenomenology (Stanford University Press, 2003), Subjectivity and Selfhood (MIT Press, 2005), and, with Shaun Ghallagher, The Phenomenological Mind (Routledge, 2008).